Labor Relations in Ontario Hospitals : A Question of Survival by Isbester, Fraser & Castle, Sandra
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Labor Relations in Ontario Hospitals : A Question of Survival"
 
Fraser Isbester et Sandra Castle
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 26, n° 2, 1971, p. 345-362.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/028218ar
DOI: 10.7202/028218ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 12:00
Labor Relations 
in Ontario Hospitals: 
A Question of Survival 
Fraser Isbester 
Sandra Castle 
The authors examine the sources of the prévalent 
unrest among Ontario Hospital employées. As the spécifie 
causes of the présent situation are outlined separately, their 
inter-relationships are to be borne in mind. 
Use of the term « labor relations » implies the existence of a System 
of co-operation which opérâtes to the mutual benefit of management and 
employées in the attainment of their respective goals and the satisfaction 
of their perceived needs. An essential factor for the maintenance of any 
co-operative System is the existence of a mutually satisfactory process for 
the discussion of common problems and the resolution of disputes. 
Furthermore, both parties must désire a harmonious relationship and must 
make a genuine attempt to appreciate the déterminants of one another's 
position. 
If thèse conditions are not met, labor exists, management exists, 
conflict exists, but « labor relations » is an impossibility. Surveying the 
events of the past décade, it is questionable whether we can claim with 
any conviction that labor relations is a fact in Ontario hospitals. 
Unionization of hospital em-
ployées initially aroused substantial 
public appréhension about potential 
work stoppages, cost increases, and 
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the implications for patient welfare. The fear of organization itself has now 
been allayed. The new spectre appears in the question of whether hospital 
employées should on moral and practical grounds be granted the right to 
strike. If thèse workers are deprived of the traditional ultimate mechanism 
for the settlement of disputes, is there an acceptable alternative for the 
achievement of labor goals ? 
Prologue : Birth and Growth of the Strike 
To gain a broad perspective of the problems confronting the Ontario 
hospitals, a brief overview of the Canadian historical background is 
warranted. 
The first Canadian hospital strike occurred in Newfoundland in 
1963 when non-professional employées of the Western Mémorial Hospital 
in Corner Brook left their jobs after two years of fruitless negotiations. 
The union, the National Union of Public Employées (NUPE)., agreed, 
however, that a skeleton crew should remain on the job to ensure the 
welfare of the patients. Although a conciliation board unanimously re-
commended wage improvements and union security provisions, the 
Hospital Board refused to accept the recommendations. Premier Small-
wood terminated the strike by establishing a one man Royal Commission 
to study the dispute. The union co-operated by suspending the strike 
for six months. Subséquent législation prohibited such strikes and created 
an arbitration board for the resolution of future disagreements 1., 
Also in 1963, a conciliation board found in favour of a wage hike 
for employées of the Prince Edward Island Hospital and the Charlottetown 
Hospital. Hère even the hospital boards conceded that the wages should be 
upgraded. However, the Hospital Services Commission (the Provincial 
Government), having budgetary authority, rejected the demands. A 
request for a strike vote was refused on the grounds that the Labour 
Relations Act prohibits striking of « necessary employées » 2. 
The most extensive hospital strike in Canada occurred in Québec 
during the summer of 1966. The strike, which originally began at 21 
hospitals, soon spread to 119 Québec institutions involving 32,500 non-
professional workers. The chief issue in the strike, which lasted from 
July 15 to August 4, was wages although other topics came under dis-
1 « N U P E Hoists Hospital Strike», Canadian Labour, (May 1963), p. 24. 
2 « P.E.I. Hospital Workers Take Wage Plea to Public », Financial Post, (July 
20, 1963), p. 5. 
LABOR RELATIONS IN ONTARIO HOSPITÀLS : A QUESTION . . . 347 
cussion and were included in the eventual agreement. In dealing with the 
walk-off Premier Johnson ousted hospital negotiators from the bargaining 
table, replacing them with a single administrator supported by the Govern-
ment and representing ail the hospitàls concerned. Seulement was reached 
two days later3. 
Turning to the Ontario scène, the incident which precipitated an 
investigation by the Ontario Government was a threatened strike of the 
Toronto General Hospital (TGH) by the Building Services Employées' 
International Union (BSEIU) 4. While the union and the TGH were 
separated on wages, a more serious issue was union security. The union 
had taken a strike vote and was in a position to strike, but the hospitaFs 
capitulation prevented a walk out. This was definitely an immédiate vie-
tory for the union but even more important, the action resulted in 
substantial government interest. There was considérable question as to 
whether the hospital could hâve operated without the services of the 
almost 1,000 workers involved5. 
The BSEIU was simultaneously involved in disputes with two other 
hospitàls : Plummer Mémorial in Sault Ste. Marie and the Sydenham 
General in Wallaceburg, the latter being a dispute which went back three 
years and was becoming more and more threatening. 
The results of this pressure was the establishment, in 1963, of a three 
man Royal Commission, headed by Judge CE. Bennett with a management 
représentative, R.V. Hicks, and a labour représentative, H. Simon, On-
tario director for the Canadian Labour Congress. The Bennett Commis-
sion was charged to report on the feasibility of compulsory arbitration 
as a mechanism for the seulement of disputes arising in the negotiation of 
collective agreements between hospitàls and their employées. Although 
the Bennett Commission recommended that compulsory arbitration be 
applied only when patient care is adversely affected or seriously threatened, 
the Ontario Législature with the passage of the Hospital Labor Disputes 
Arbitration Act in 1965, not only imposed compulsory arbitration, but 
also prohibited strikes and lock-outs in hospitàls. This provision becomes 
effective if conciliation is unsuccessful and if a further seven days of direct 
3 « Québec Hospital Strike Ended by Government », Labour Gazette, (October 
1966), p. 560. 
4 Later to become known as the Services Employées' International Union 
(SEIU). 
5 « Hospital Staff Arbitration : Beginning New Labour Trend ? » Financial 
Post, (May 18, 1963), p. 34. 
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negotiations between the hospital and employées does not produce agree-
ment. 
The décision of the provincial government to initiate législation to 
prohibit hospital strikes was strengthened by another incident ; a three 
month strike at the Trenton Mémorial Hospital by the BSEÏU. The 
hospital operated with strike breakers but enough friction resulted to 
warrant a provincial inquiry. Eventually, the strike was settied by the 
Royal Commission itself, acting as a committee of inquiry. 
By this time hospital unions had emerged from their obscure posi-
tion in Canadian society. More than 30,000 non-professional employées 
of hospitals had been organized. Of thèse, approximately one third 
belonged to the BSEIU and the other two thirds to two unions that merged 
into the Canadian Union of Public Employées (CUPE). 
Criticisms of the implementation of the Hospital Arbitration Act 
hâve been expressed by the professional, semi-professional, and non-
prof essional sectors of hospital staffs. Other common difficulties in nego-
tiations hâve also been encountered, although the particular status and 
rôle of each group has brought differing responses and methods of register-
ing dissatisfaction. 
The causal factors of the unions* nascent struggle remain as the 
sources of the prévalent unrest among hospital employées. Each problem, 
while signif icant in itself, cannot be considered in isolation if the magnitude 
of the difficulty is to be appreciated and solutions found before a labor-
management-government impasse is reached. As the spécifie causes of the 
présent situation are outlined, the inter-relationships among wage levels, 
governmental wage control, compulsory arbitration, and the prohibition 
of the right to strike must be borne in mind. 
Crippling Effects on Unions 
WAGES AND WAGE CONTROL 
Hospital employées hâve traditionally occupied a low place on the 
wage scale in both the United States and Canada. From 1966-68, there 
were 57 work stoppages among hospital employées in the United States. 
During 1966-67, strike participation was found primarily in the nursing 
and other professional groups. However, in 1968 strike concentration 
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shifted to the semi-professional and non-professional health care em-
ployées 6. 
This growing emphasis on removal of the wage disparity between 
hospital workers and other sectors of the labor force is also évident in 
most Canadian provinces where the récent union demands hâve stressed the 
fact that hospital employées through low wages are being required to 
subsidize the public. To compensate for the years of depressed levels of 
rémunération, the unions are demanding large wage increases to place 
hospital workers on an économie par with similar workers in private 
enterprises. 
Proceeding towards this goal, the Canadian Union of Public Em-
ployées (CUPE) obtained in 1967 wage increases between 17% and 
30% for hospital employées in British Columbia. Also in 1967 it was 
regarded as a breakthrough when the minimum wage level for maie hospi-
tal workers in Toronto and Hamilton rose above $2 per hour7. An 
indication that further steps towards equity may be anticipated occurred 
in 1969 when the Service Employées' International Union (SEIU) gained 
a 25% increase over two years for employées in six Ontario hôspitals in 
Brantford, St. Catherines, Niagara Falls, Welland and Toronto8. 
Récent awards in Ontario hâve often been in contravention of the 
wage increase guidelines established by the Ontario Hospital Services 
Commission (OHSC). The économie influence of this non-participating 
third party to the collective bargaining process is a major source of 
dissatisfaction for employées, management and arbitration boards. Varia-
tions of the wage ceiling situation are présent across Canada. Dealing first 
with the Ontario expérience, the OHSC supplies capital and operating 
funds to the province's hôspitals and holds budgetary authority. Under 
this system, the OHSC establishes the total allowable increase in each 
hospitaPs budget and recommends a wage ceiling. In 1969, the increase 
was initially established at 6.5% and later revised to 8.5% 9. Although 
hôspitals are informed that they may exceed this amount, they are also 
advised that any additional increases will hâve to be offset by économies 
in other areas of their budgets. This requirement naturally places hospital 
administrators in an untenable position during collective bargaining. 
6 Monthly Labor Review (December 1969), p. 32. 
7 «Big Pay Demands Stoke Fires », Financial Post, (October 7, 1967), p. 3. 
8 «Toronto Plumbers Labor's Bellwether», Financial Post, (July 5, 1969), 
p. 10. 
9 Ibid. -
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In 1969 arbitration boards established to settle disputes in Windsor 
and Brampton ignored the OHSC guidelines in making wage increase 
awards.10 The arbitration board report of July, 1969 for assessment 
of the disagreement between the Hamilton Civic Hospitals and the Cana-
dian Union of Public Employées recommended a 20% wage increase n . 
Similar situations hâve been encountered in other provinces. For 
example, in 1967, after conciliation the Central Newfoundland Hospital 
Corporation and CUPE reached agreement on wage increases for 
nursing assistants, orderlies, maids, kitchen and laundry workers. How-
ever, the increase was denied by the provincial Department of Health 
which controls the Corporation's budget. The Saskatchewan Government 
in 1969 established a wage increase ceiling of 6% for hospital workers. 
The lack of freedom in collective bargaining is also encountered in 
Québec where the hospitals are legally able to conclude an agreement 
with employées but the government reserves the right to impose a settle-
ment. Being forced to operate within the confines of wage ceilings 
established by législative bodies which do not take part in the bargaining 
process, Canadian unions and hospital employées are unable to undertake 
true negotiations. The arbitration board report for the seulement between 
CUPE and the Hamilton Civic Hospitals emphasized that the OHSC, if 
it continues to retain the ultimate decision-making power in wage matters, 
must play a direct and active rôle in the bargaining process. In June 1969, 
the SEIU in a protest to the Ontario Minister of Health stated that 
either the OHSC must, by withdrawing its power to set wage guidelines, 
allow unions to bargain freely with hospitals, or the OHSC must assume 
sole responsibility for bargaining with the unions. 
RIGHT TO STRIKE 
Compounding the problem in several provinces is the création of 
législation which prohibits hospital workers from utilizing the strike as a 
mechanism for gaining improved wage settlements. In Saskatchewan, 
while workers may strike, the government has the right to enforce législa-
tion to end the strike and submit the dispute to compulsory arbitration. 
If a strike continues more than 10 days beyond the application of this 
législation, the government may dissolve the union. In spite of this threat, 
10 Canadian Labor, (May 1969), p. 12. 
n Canadian Union of Public Employées (local 794) and Board of Governors 
of Hamilton Civic Hospitals, Report of the Arbitration Board, July 25, 1969. 
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Saskatchewan hospitals in 1969 experienced a 50% increase in the number 
of strikes with récent walk-outs occurring at Prince Albert and Estevan 12. 
Newfoundland's Grand Falls Hospital dispute resulted in a strike 
which prompted the province to invoke the Labor Relations Act and 
déclare a state of emergency in the hospitals. This législation forced the 
hospital workers to return to work under threat of heavy fines and 
decertification of the union. 
Although hospital workers in Québec may strike, the possibility of 
government counter législation is effective in instilling unions with caution 
in the use of the strike. 
In Ontario, dissatisfaction with the bargaining environment and the 
économie situation has become severe enough for CUPE to state that 
illégal strikes may be required for removal of the injustice apparent in 
the hospital wage structure 13. The White Paper submitted by the Canadian 
Union of Public Employées to the Ontario Législature in June 1969 
maintains that while the ability to initiate strike action is essential for 
successful negotiations, the existence of the right does not imply that it 
will be implemented irresponsibly. If used with discrétion, the Union 
points out, strikes in hospitals would not be detrimental to patient care 
or damaging to the public interest. A strike, therefore, is not necessarily 
a négative or destructive mechanism used for satisfying demands at the 
public expense. 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
A further hinderance to the development of maturity in the bargaining 
process is the présence of compulsory arbitration. This requirement, when 
considered in relation to governmental influence, leads both management 
and labor to rely upon the ultimate intervention of a third party to achieve 
reconciliation of différences. CUPE has expressed its préférence for a 
system which would allow the parties to accept responsibility for direct 
négociations without compulsory referral to a third party, whether media-
tor, conciliator or arbitrator. With a minimum of restrictive législation and 
with the possibility of voluntary arbitration, it is contended that mutually 
satisfactory settlements can be obtained and that management-labor 
interaction may be improved. 
12 «Hospital Standoff on the Prairies», Financial Post, (December 6, 1969), 
p. 22. 
13 Canadian Labor, (May 1969), p. 12. 
352 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 2 6 , NO 2 
Among the difficulties presently encountered by hospital unions are : 
(1) régional wage disparities ; (2) lack of expérience in bargaining ; and 
(3) the fact that the public hospital System créâtes, in effect, an employer 
monopoly on a provincial basis. Efforts are being made to establish 
province-wide bargaining, with allowances for régional requirements, for 
hospital employées. This position is supported by CUPE and was also 
suggested in 1969 by an Ontario arbitration board14. However, more 
économie research will be required before régional or provincial bargaining 
can be implemented. The monopoly situation is somewhat ameliorated 
by compétition among the provinces for hospital workers and by the 
ability of employées to move to other fields of employment. For instance, 
in Ontario last year, 50% of the hospital orderlies and 33% of the nurses 
left the hospitals (most, one assumes), to take up more lucrative em-
ployment 15. 
The Condition of Professional Group® 
Thus far, the discussion has centred on the non-professional com-
ponents of hospital staffs. However, there is organizational and bargaining 
activity also emerging within the professional hospital employée groups. 
As the entrepreneurial aspects of professionalism recède and as profes-
sionals become salaried employées, the need for collective action becomes 
évident. The development of unionization among professionals is a slow 
process due to a variety of factors among which are the traditional pré-
férence of professionals to make individual décisions ; the professional 
mistrust of the quality of union leadership ; the question of whether 
unionization is consistent with professional status ; and the influence of 
collective action on professional ethics. 
As E.M. Kassalow has noted, the increase of social security measures 
in the field of health care has brought a consolidation of « health con-
sumers ». The accompanying décline in the personal relationship between 
professional and patient is resulting in a parallel grouping of « health 
producers » to establish through negotiation appropriate fee structures 16. 
In Québec, since 1960 the union membership of salaried hospital em-
ployées has been increasing rapidly, including in addition to nurses, para-
médical staff such as psychologists and social workers. 
14
 CUPE (local 794) and Hamilton Civic Hospitals op. cit. 
15 Canadian Labour, (May 1969), p. 12. 
16 «Emerging Sectors of Collective Bargaining», Labor Gazette, (June 1968), 
p. 320. 
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Among nurses, initial attempts to influence the terms and conditions 
of employment involved the issuance by the Canadian Nurses' Association 
of recommended personnel policies with the hope that individual nurses 
would adhère to thèse principles in their own negotiations. This measure had 
little effect with the resuit that nurses' salaries were frequently lower than 
those of organized X-ray and laboratory technicians 17. Discontent with 
heavy work-loads, poor working conditions, and salaries which are 
inéquitable has led nursing associations in ail ten provinces to undertake 
collective bargaining and to establish programmes to familiarize nurses with 
negotiation principles and procédures. 
The bargaining situation varies from province to province. In some 
areas, nurses may bargain under gênerai provincial labor législation ; in 
others the provincial nurses' association, which is also the licensing body, 
is specifically designated as the bargaining agent ; and in other provinces, 
bargaining is undertaken through joint agreements with employers, al-
though provincial législation excludes nurses from bargaining under the 
labor act. 
In British Columbia, province-wide agreements are negotiated bet-
ween the Registered Nurses Association and the British Columbia Hos-
pital Association. Thèse groups may then submit a joint représentation 
to the government, which is the budgetary authority, for increases in 
hospital income and salaries. Nurses in British Columbia retain the right 
to strike. Province-wide bargaining also occurs in Saskatchewan, although 
compulsory arbitration is required for dispute settlement. Québec nurses 
did not exercise their bargaining rights until 1966 when the local asso-
ciation, the United Nurses of Montréal, was organized. This association 
engaged in a very successful strike in July of 1966. 
In Ontario, 1200 nurses hâve organized under the Labor Relations 
Act in 30 collective bargaining associations, which negotiate with hospital 
boards at the city county levels. The problem of co-ordinating the action 
of Ontario nurses is aggravated by the fact that, unlike other provinces, 
registered nurses are not required to be members of the Registered Nurses 
Association of Ontario. Therefore, the Association in making représen-
tations to the provincial government is unable to claim to speak for ail 
nurses with in the province. 
During disagreements, nurses in Ontario hâve avoided the require-
ment for compulsory arbitration through the use of a procédure known 
17 CORMICK, G.W., «The Collective Bargaining Expérience of Canadian 
Registered Nurses», Labor Law Journal, (October 1969), p. 669. 
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as 'grey-listing\ Under this System, ail nurses are requested to refuse to 
accept employment with a hospital or county health board which does 
not reach agreement with a local bargaining unit. This mechanism has 
proved successful in negotiations with Peel County in 1966 and with 
the joint Stormount, Dundas, and Glengarry board in 1967. In 1969, 
following the breakdown of negotiations between the Association and the 
Hamilton School of Nursing, a six week strike of ail professional nursing 
staff ensued resulting in a settlement favourable to the nurses. 
With the exclusion of supervisory personnel from the bargaining 
unit, local nurses' associations hâve been afflicted by a lack of leadership. 
To rectify this difficulty, the Canadian Nurses Association has established 
a Social and Economie Welfare Commission which provides research and 
advisory services for provincial groups. Provincial associations hâve re-
cently been hiring personnel who are skilled in negotiation procédures. 
In Ontario, nurses' groups may gain bargaining strength as a resuit 
of the approval by the Ontario Hospital Association (OHA) of joint 
bargaining rights on a régional basis for nurses and other paramédical 
personnel18. Subséquent to consultations with hospitals having nurses' 
associations, a working committee of the OHA prepared a proposai out-
lining procédures for the institution of joint bargaining for nurses. By 
June, 1970, seventeen hospitals had given approval in principle to a 
System of negotiations which would provide a master agreement to govern 
relationships between the participating hospitals and nurses' associations 19. 
Supplementing the régional master agreement would be individual con-
tracts between each hospital and the appropriate association. Although 
the time required for préparation precludes the introduction of group 
bargaining during the 1970 negotiations, représentatives of the R.N.A.O. 
hâve agreed to the principle. 
A national view illustrâtes that provinces with strong collective 
bargaining units hâve obtained the greatest wage increases. Thèse pro-
vinces are British Columbia, Ontario, Québec, and Prince Edward Island, 
which hâve been between 1967 and 1969 gained increases ranging from 
17.5% to 30.3% 20. 
18 « Give Go-ahead to Joint Bargaining with Nursing and Other Personnel », 
Hospital Administration in Canada, (December 1969), p. 19. 
!9 WILSON, J.C., « Group Bargaining : A Progress Report » paper delivered 
at the General Session of the O.H.A., October 28, 1970. 
20 CORNICK, G.W., «The Collective Bargaining Expérience of Canadian Regis-
tered Nurses», Labor Law Journal, (October 1969), p. 682. 
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Management : A Potential Therapeutic Force ? 
RÔLE OF THE ADMINISTRATION 
With the strengthening of employée organizations and the acceptance 
of collective bargaining as a standard procédure for establishing the terms 
and conditions of employment in hospitals, new emphasis is being placed 
on defining the appropriate rôle of the hospital administrator in employée 
relations. Hospital administrators in past years hâve been drawn from 
two major sources : individuals who possess a background in account-
ing or gênerai business management ; and doctors who hâve transferred 
from médical practice to administration. Both groups lack the breadth 
of expérience and knowledge required to function effectively in the 
complex task of managing a health care facility. In a new era, the trend 
to train and appoint professional hospital administrators indicates that 
an improvement in the organizational functioning of hospitals may be 
anticipated. Currently, in Canada, there are approximately 1,000 graduâtes 
of the Hospital Organization and Management programme21. 
In a brief overview of the problems of hospital management, the 
observor is struck by the ambiguity of the administrator's position. He is 
usually an individual who is assigned heavy responsibility but little au-
thority. He is directly responsible to the institution's board of trustées, 
but must be responsible to the demands of the médical staff and to the 
directives of the provincial government. Although his prime functions 
should be to plan for the maintenance and development of the hospital 
and to implement policies and measures approved by the board of 
trustées, a large proportion of his time is devoted to the reconciliation 
of conflicting interests to achieve established goals. Of the 1,200 public 
and fédéral hospitals in Canada, 85% are in the small or médium size 
catégories22. Thèse institutions, being financially unable to support a 
large administrative staff, rely on the manager or director to supervise 
daily opérations, thus affording him little time to spend on the important 
areas of planning, cost control, operational efficiency, and personnel 
development. 
INCOME/EXPENSE CONFLICT 
Aggravating the problem is the fact that in récent years, the Canadian 
Government and public hâve placed increased pressure upon hospital 
21 « Provincial Groups Best for Administrators », Hospital Administration in 
Canada (September 1969), p. 5. 
22 WEIR, D.L., « Provincial Groups Best for Administrators », Hospital Ad-
ministration in Canada, (September 1969), pp. 4-8. 
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management stimultaneously to provide more extensive, higher quality 
health care services and to effect stabilization or réduction in the expen-
diture of public funds. Although consumer demand may increase and 
expenses may increase, the hospital, being subject to the OHSC price 
ceillings, cannot respond with an increase in rates. The concern for the 
financial aspects of health care has been stressed by the création in 1969 
of a Federal-Provincial committee to study the escalating costs of hospital 
and public health services in Canada, and to examine the wage structures 
and operational efficiency in thèse areas23. Governmental scrutiny is 
also emanating from the Ontario Council of Health, a body established 
in 1967 as a senior advisory group to the Ontario Minister of Health. 
The Council's report, which is expected in the near future, will include 
recommandations on such aspects of health as manpower, éducation, 
research, and the cost effectiveness of alternative deployment of physical 
and financial resources 24. 
In the midst of thèse forces to promote operating efficiency, admi-
nistrators are confronted with a counter influence which will act to 
increase operating expenses. One of the major effects of the advent of 
unionization of hospital employées will be an increase in the absolute 
and perhaps proportionate amount of the budget allocated to wages. 
Since the hospital administrator has minimal control over the funds 
provided by the government or over the cost of labor and technology, 
and has no influence on the public demand for accessible, high quality 
services and the concomitant demand for manpower, he must direct his 
attention to an internai assessment of structure, opérations, resources, 
and needs. One means of increasing the efficiency of resource utilization 
lies in the close analysis of the flow and assignment of work. Through 
restructuring the organization and combining eliminating and simplifying 
tasks, the administrators are providing a foundation for increased employée 
productivity so as to achieve a réduction in staff. To meet the problems 
of increasing costs, attention has been given to the possibility of several 
health units undertaking joint opération of common non-medical func-
tions. If co-ordination difficulties can be overcome, substantial savings 
will be effected in such areas as accounting, data processing and laundry 
services. 
23 « Secrétariat Formed for Health Costs Study », Hospital Administration in 
Canada, (Mard i 1969), p. 17. 
24 « Give Go-ahead to Joint Bargaining with Nurses and Other Personnel », 
Hospital Administration in Canada, (December 1969), p. 19. 
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Another means of controlling costs is the current emphasis on home 
care and out-patient clinics. While thèse measures may relieve the pres-
sure on plant resources, the administrator must ensure that a décline in 
the quality of patient care is not an unintended conséquence. However, 
before service innovations are implemented, comprehensive analysis of 
the total hospital structure is essential to diagnose and remedy possible 
functional disorders. 
PERSONNEL RESTORATION 
Budget control and other financial management techniques cannot, 
and should not, be applied in isolation from considération of the human 
factor. In récognition of the fact that collective action arose among 
hospital employées in response to low salaries, absence of adéquate per-
sonnel programmes, lack of job security and opportunity for advance-
ment, and gênerai dissatisfaction with the work environment, the Ame-
rican Hospital Association in 1956 adopted a Basic Personnel Policy 
which states, in part : 
« Modem hospital management is striving to provide for ail hospital 
employées, compensation, working conditions, and other personnel 
practices at least at levels prevailing for équivalent work in the com-
munity. No other principle is both fair to the community which 
supports the hospital and to the employées whose work makes the 
hospital effective » 25. 
The growth of unions has accentuated the need within hospitals 
for the development of programmes which will implement the principles 
implicit in this statement. 
Training programmes to date hâve been primarily directed to new 
entrants to the field of hospital work. Future efforts for the achievement 
of réductions in costs and employée turnover must place equal emphasis 
on up-grading the skills of présent employées. Hospitals, faced with 
problems similar to those experienced by private enterprise, must develop 
co-ordinated, extensive training programmes based on a thorough ana-
lysis of the community's potential requirements, the institution's long-
range objectives, présent and future needs, and présent and future re-
sources. 
25 American Hospital Association, Hospitals and Employée Groups, Personnel 
Séries, No. 2, (Chicago). 
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Among the measures suggested to eliminate inefficiencies and pro-
mote the effective utilization of hospital manpower are : 
a) récognition that stress on technical proficiency to the exclusion 
of concern for individual job satisfaction can only hâve deleterious 
effects ; 
b) the création within the hospital environment of a climate which 
recognizes individual achievement and stimulâtes potential ; 
c) the introduction of financial incentives to increase productivity ; 
d) compétitive compensation and benefit plans to reduce turnover 
and facilitate recruitment ; 
e) the application of training techniques to provide opportunities 
for advancement to positions of greater responsibility ; 
f) the development of new flexible training Systems to meet parti-
cular needs of health workers 26, 27. 
Since the financial and managerial investment required for a com-
prehensive, productive training programme hâve proved prohibitive for 
many hospitals, there hâve been several centralized training programmes 
established in the United States to service groups of hospitals. 
In Ontario hospitals, the study of manpower utilization and develop-
ment has been neglected. Administrators now face the challenge of 
devising and implementing new methods to increase employée product-
ivity, satisfaction and commitment. 
Specifically in the area of collective bargaining, assistance is available 
for Ontario hospital administrators. In 1968, the Hospital Personnel 
Relations Bureau was established under a 1966 provincial charter, to 
(i) represent member hospitals in negotiation, arbitration and maintenance 
of collective agreements and (ii) promote interest in and study of em-
ployer-employée relations28. This voluntary group, with 83 member 
hospitals, has also created a Personnel Relations Committee in co-ope-
ration with the OHA and the Hospital Council of Metropolitan Toronto 
to develop wage guidelines in non-union areas and to undertake research 
on hospital job classifications. 
26 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of the Secre-
tary's Advisory Committee on Hospital Effectiveness, 1968. 
27 BENNETT, A.C., « Are Our Manpower Problems Completely Insoluble ? », 
Hospital Topics, (September 1968), pp. 26-28. 
28 ROBINSON, E.C., « Personnel Relations Bureau is Winning Wider Accept-
ance », Hospital Administration in Canada, (January 1970), p. 35. 
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Although total acceptance of the Bureau's assistance has been 
precluded by the fear among hospitals of the loss of autonomy, a graduai 
movement to province-wide collective bargaining is evinced in the joint 
development by the OHA and the Bureau of plans for the implementation 
of régional bargaining. Initial efforts in this area will concentrate on 
contractual relations with nurses' associations. In the fall of 1970, re-
présentatives of the Personnel Relations Bureau also undertook explora-
tory discussions to assess the position of laboratory technologists, x-ray 
technicians, and physiotherapists to group bargaining. The fact that 
régional bargaining has successfully been undertaken by three Guelph 
hospitals vérifies the contention that if hospitals are willing to overcome 
their suspicion and replace internai compétition with co-operation, a 
co-ordinated approach to negotiations can be developed. Progression to 
a provincial System of bargaining for ail public health care institutions, 
with allowance for contract variations to reflect the situations of particular 
types of units and géographie areas, will be to the advantage of both 
unions and hospitals in their relationships with each other and, more 
importantly, in their dealings with the government. In the création of 
a cohesive structure, Ontario can benefit from examination of the pro-
vincial bargaining expérience of British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and 
Québec and the implementation plans of New Brunswick. However, On-
tario administrators must eradicate inter-hospital hostility before unity 
can be achieved in the labor situation. 
The onus for developing and applying the therapy which is essential 
for improvement of hospital performance clearly rests with each manager. 
Pre-Conditions for Survival 
It is évident that labor relations in the mature sensé does not exist 
in Ontario for professional or non-professional groups. Nor will it exist 
until the major parties involved are prepared and are permitted to bargain 
without externally imposed restraints. 
If the présent bargaining environment is maintained, the implica-
tions of wage ceillings, compulsory arbitration, and prohibition of strike 
action may be expected to resuit in a large number of illégal strikes, one-
day work stoppages, rotating strikes, and slow-downs designed to incon-
venience hospital management, while maintaining essential patient care 
facilities. The effect on organizational efficiency is obvious. However, it 
is to be hoped that the provincial government will heed the increasing 
pressure to implement measures which will allow a greater degree of 
freedom in the bargaining process. 
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Fact-finding boards hâve often been suggested as a substitute for 
compulsory arbitration. Such boards, after thorough investigation of a 
dispute, may formulate recommendations which will influence settlement 
through re-direction of public opinion or through pressure on either party. 
The mère threat of public exposure of certain financial facts may be a 
sufficient incentive to management and labor to reach settlement. As D.H. 
Wollet has stated, « If fact-finding is to serve as an adéquate substitute 
for the strike, it must be sufficiently unattractive that employers and 
employées will usually find it préférable to make their own agreements 29. 
In the hospital context, révélation of the provincial financial situation 
could consolidate the position of unions and management in opposition 
to the provincial budgetary authority. 
Although fact-finding may perhaps be a useful mechanism in the 
avoidance of strike action, it is similar to compulsory arbitration in that 
it precludes the development of responsible, mature interaction between 
labor and management. 
If labor relations are to survie in hospitals, the following conditions 
must be met : 
1. Collective bargaining should take place on a provincial level 
between an association of hospital administrators and associations 
of union représentatives for professional and non-professional 
employées. The provincial government may act in the capacity 
of consultant during thèse negotiations, but must not hold deci-
sion-making power. 
2. Pre-bargaining provincial study groups, composed of equal num-
bers of management and employée représentatives might be 
useful to delineate areas of potential conflict, and to create an 
atmosphère of co-operation. 
3. The power of the Ontario Hospital Services Commission to 
establish wage ceilings must be removed. 
4. The right to strike must be granted to hospital employées subject 
to a union guarantee that services essential to patient: welfare 
will be maintained during any stoppage. 
5. Hospital administrators in récognition of the rôle of human 
resources as a major input in the achievement of institutional 
29 MCKELVEY, J.T., « Fact Finding in Public Employment Disputes : Promise 
or Illustration», Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (July 1969), p. 541. 
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goals, must increase their sensitivity to employée demands and 
must acquire knowledge of the negotiation process. 
6. Opportunities for up-grading of obsolescent managers and for 
training of professional administrators are required. Managers 
must start managing instead of merely administering 
7. Attempts must be made by unions and hospitals to familiârize 
employées with the éléments of collective bargaining and With 
the basic économie principles which apply to the field of public 
health care. 
Thèse recommendations could hâve the dual effect of improving the 
collective bargaining environment in the hospitals and the efficiency of 
hospital opérations. 
MEILLEURES RELATIONS DU TRAVAIL 
DANS LES HÔPITAUX ONTARIENS : 
CONDITION DE SURVIE ? 
Le terme « relations du travail » implique l'existence d'un mécanisme qui, 
d'une part permet le fonctionnement harmonieux de l'ensemble, c'est-à-dire à la 
satisfaction mutuelle des parties, et d'autre part fournit une base, voire la solution 
pour la résolution d'éventuels conflits. Bonne volonté et esprit de coopération sont 
nécessaires au développement d'une telle entente. 
Si l'on considère les événements survenus ces dix dernières années, on peut 
douter de l'existence de réelles relations du travail dans les hôpitaux d'Ontario. 
Accorder le droit de grève aux employés des hôpitaux c'est laisser la porte 
ouverte à de possibles exagérations et tout ce que cela comporte. D'un autre côté 
il est difficile de refuser aux employés une arme qui leur est nécessaire, à moins 
qu'il n'existe une solution de rechange. Y en a-t-il une? C'est le but de cette étude 
de le démontrer. 
À cause de sa signification particulière, elle est à la fois force et faiblesse pour 
les deux parties, la grève dans les hôpitaux est l'objet de l'attention du gouverne-
ment. En Ontario cela résulta dans le « Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act > 
(1965) qui impose aux parties l'arbitrage obligatoire et interdit grèves et lock-out, 
après un délai qui doit être mis à profit pour essayer de trouver une solution! 
Cette interférence du gouvernement a un certain nombre de conséquences défa-
vorables aux syndicats. 
LE CONTRÔLE DES SALAIRES 
Les syndicats cherchent à obtenir la parité des salaires avec les autres secteurs 
de l'économie. Il arrive souvent que le résultat des efforts dans ce domaine des 
administrateurs et des syndicats soient réduits à néant par l'intervention d'organis-
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mes, tel l'Ontario Hospital Services Commission (O.H.S.C.), qui dans les faits 
contrôlent la hausse des salaires. Le fait que l'O.H.S.C. ait, parmi d'autres, ce pou-
voir, est la source de déception et est une restriction à la liberté de négociation. 
Les syndicats voudraient voir l'O.H.S.C. soit ne pas intervenir du tout, soit être le 
seul interlocuteur face aux syndicats. 
LE DROIT DE GRÈVE 
Dans plusieurs Provinces la législation en vigueur restreint les employés de 
recourir à la grève pour parvenir à leurs fins. En Ontario les syndicats énoncent 
l'éventuelle possibilité d'une grève illégale et revendiquent le plein droit de grève, 
soulignant le fait que l'existence d'un tel droit n'est pas synonyme de mauvaise 
utilisation. 
L'ARBITRAGE OBLIGATOIRE 
Du fait de son existence, employés comme directions ont tendance à se reposer 
sur lui plutôt que de chercher eux-mêmes une solution. Le recours à un arbitrage 
volontaire devrait rétablir une situation normale où la négociation est effective 
entre les deux parties. 
LES PROBLÈMES DES DIRECTIONS 
Manque de préparation pour la tâche à accomplir, trop de responsabilités et 
pas les pouvoirs nécessaires, caractérisent le groupe des Administrateurs d'hôpitaux. 
De plus le manque de personnel dans de nombreux hôpitaux, les restreint à la gestion 
quotidienne de l'établissement. Les ressources financières des hôpitaux ne s'accrois-
sent pas aussi vite que les coûts. Sous la pression de syndicats les salaires ont une 
part croissante du budget. Puisque les administrateurs n'ont pas le pouvoir de con-
trôler les ressources et les coûts, la seule façon de garder un budget équilibré est 
de faire des économies d'échelles, en regroupant les services administratifs., soit des 
économies de productivité. Cela suppose l'existence de programmes de recyclage et 
de formation pour les employés. C'est encore un domaine négligé en Ontario. Il 
existe, dans cette Province, un «Bureau du personnel hospitalier» qui pourrait être 
utile ici. La condition à cette aide, cependant, est l'application uniforme des mesures 
à toute la Province, et beaucoup d'hôpitaux ne veulent pas sacrifier une partie de 
leur autonomie. 
Pour la survie effective des relations du travail dans les hôpitaux ontariens, 
un certain nombre de conditions doivent être remplies. Ce qui n'est pas le cas à 
l'heure actuelle. 
1) Les négociations collectives doivent se faire à l'échelon provincial. Le gou-
vernement étant un consultant. 
2) Des comités paritaires doivent, avant l'ouverture des négociations, détermi-
ner quelles questions seront à traiter. 
3) Le droit de grève (conditionnel, dans l'intérêt des malades) doit demeurer 
entier. Le contrôle des hausses de salaire doit disparaître. 
4) Un effort doit être fait du côté de la direction pour améliorer la qualité des 
administrateurs, dans leur travail comme dans leurs rapports avec les em-
ployés. 
5) L'éducation des employés en matières syndicales, particulièrement le méca-
nisme et l'économie des négociations collectives, est à faire. 
